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1. Introduction 
 
A combination of political, economic and technological factors enabled a remarkable 
world-wide experiment of introducing market-based reforms and restructuring of the 
electricity sector starting the early 1980s (Pollitt, 2012). The importance of the 
electricity industry in social welfare and economic development implies that the 
outcomes of reforms in the sector are crucial. The centralized natural monopoly 
characteristics of the power systems also conceptually make them a public utility 
(Victor and Heller, 2007). Hence, the lessons of experience from reforms in the power 
sector matter and can serve as important economic and political tests for governments 
undertaking the reforms. 
 
Ample amounts of financial resources and effort have been spent in electricity sector 
reforms across the reforming countries. However, the reform process demonstrates no 
clear theoretical and empirical consensus regarding the economic gains of reforms apart 
from improvements in technical and operational efficiency in the sector across many of 
the reforming countries. Reforms seem to have improved productive and operational 
efficiency in many developed and transition countries although allocative efficiency has 
deteriorated in the early reform process1 (Jamasb et al., 2005a). However, it is not clear 
whether the gain in productive efficiency resulted from technological improvements or 
from the adoption of reforms. In many developing countries, reforms seem to be largely 
ineffective in inducing efficiency improvements with minimal or no effect on poverty 
and income inequality.  
 
The application and success of market-driven reform model in power sectors of less-
developed countries seems to have been unsuccessful after more than two decades of 
reforms (Besant-Jones, 2006; Kessides, 2012). In transition economies, the reforms 
have been erratic, heterogeneous and marked by political reluctance resulting in slow 
                                                          
1 The transition countries include 29 countries of Central Eastern Europe and Baltic States 
(CEB), South Eastern Europe (SEE), and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) based on 
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) classification. 
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implementation of reforms (Williams and Ghanadan, 2006). Similarly, there is a wide 
variation in the progress with the implementation of the model even in the EU while 
compliance with the directives does not necessarily imply a thorough-going electricity 
reform (Newbery, 2002; Pollitt, 2009a)2. In the US, reforms have mainly not performed 
well even though major progress has been made in removing the costly price and entry 
regulation affecting almost every energy sector directly or indirectly over the last nearly 
four decades (Joskow, 2009).  
  
Most notably, the UK, one of the pioneers of market-based reforms, has proposed a new 
electricity market reform signalling the desire for significant government intervention in 
order to meet the climate change objectives (DECC, 2011). As such, the UK reform 
experience has revealed the considerable complexities and difficulties in making market 
driven reforms work when the global trend towards electricity reforms is driven by 
orthodox ideologies and theoretical arguments in favour of market-oriented reforms 
since nearly two decades. The resulting regulatory failures in terms of investment 
inadequacy has been a concern in the liberalisation process in developed economies 
such as the UK even though the incentive regulation of the monopoly electricity 
networks  has resulted in significant efficiency improvements (Helm, 2009). Likewise, 
the regulation of the electricity sector in developing and transition countries remain a 
major challenge in the transition to accelerating competition in the electricity sector as 
regulation suffers from weak institutional environment (Laffont, 2005). 
 
However, market driven reforms are still on-going in many countries while the reform 
process in the electricity sector is regarded as not only possible, but also inevitable 
(Erdogdu, 2013). It is, therefore, necessary and timely to revisit the experience of the 
process and impacts of market-driven reform trend and draw lessons learnt in the 
aftermath of this remarkable experiment. In general, successful electricity reforms 
should enhance the efficiency of the sector, improve electricity access and reliability, 
improve service quality, reduce the price-cost gap through cost-reflective pricing and 
                                                          
2  For example, Germany began the electricity market liberalisation process in 1998 without 
having an independent regulator in place. The energy regulator Bundesnetzagentur (BNETZA) 
was only created in 2005. 
increase investments considering more than two decades' of reform  in reforming 
economies (Sen and Jamasb, 2012). Hence, this paper reflects on the process and 
outcomes of liberal electricity reforms and examine whether evidence supports and 
verifies the motives of market-driven power sector reforms in less developed, transition 
and developed countries based on country specific case-studies.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two provides a brief 
overview of the market-based reform model. Section three discusses the drivers of 
reforms in developing, transition and developed countries while the contexts of reforms 
are discussed in Section four. The country-specific case studies analysis on the reform 
process, progress and outcomes are presented in Section five. Section six details the 
lessons and policy implications of reforms in developing, transition and developed 
countries based on the case-studies. Section seven concludes the paper with suggestions 
for further research. 
 
2. Overview of the reform model 
 
The early 1980s gave rise to the ‘standard textbook model’ for organizing and 
restructuring the electricity sectors across many countries around the world. The model 
was based on market-oriented liberal policies and typically constituted of three 
fundamental components (Joskow, 2008). The first element involved the vertical 
separation or unbundling of the potentially competitive segments (wholesale generation 
and retail supply) from the natural monopoly segments (transmission and distribution 
networks). The model assumed that not all activities of the electricity supply industry 
are inherently monopolistic and electricity could also be generated and supplied by 
competitive firms in organised markets and not by the state. It was believed that vertical 
separation of these distinct activities would guard against cross-subsidization between 
competitive businesses and regulated businesses and discriminatory practices such as 
denial of access to networks (Joskow, 2006).  
 
The second component of the model underscored the need and role of private ownership 
of the competitive segments of the ESI on the notion that private entities could better 
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allocate the scarce capital resources and ensure efficient management of the system. It 
was perceived that privatisation of state-owned electricity monopolies would create hard 
budget constraints and high-powered incentives for efficiency improvements and make 
it more difficult for the state to use these industries in order to meet costly political 
agendas such as patronage employment, unfavourable macroeconomic and 
redistributive policies and national revenue diversion to government budgets outside of 
the tax system (Joskow, 2006). However, private ownership of the sector in countries 
such as Japan, Germany and the US had occurred before 1980s and has been pervasive 
throughout the post-World War II period. Similarly, the success of the electricity reform 
in Norway with large local and regional ownership exhibits that privatisation is not an 
indispensable aspect of successful electricity reform. 
 
The third component of the standard model stressed on the need to create powerful and 
effective new institutions in the form of independent regulators and regulatory agencies.  
An independent regulator would act as the custodian of public interests (Armstrong et 
al., 1994). It was expected that an independent regulatory authority with adequate staff, 
powers, duties and information about the costs, service quality and performance of the 
ESI will ensure a proper conduct in the industry by effectively implementing the 
incentive regulation of the monopoly segments in terms of the market entry, network 
charges and network access. Hence, it was assumed that incentive regulation of the 
monopoly electricity networks would mimic the outcomes of a competitive market 
(Littlechild, 1992). As such, the US already had independent state and federal energy 
sector regulators and private ownership since the early 20th century and some wholesale 
electricity markets prior to 1980s (Pollitt, 2011). 
 
Chile was the first developing country to apply the 'standard textbook model' in 1982.  
The Chilean reform sequence involved the following steps: i) establishment of the 
electricity market regulator at the start, ii) corporatization of state-owned enterprise, iii) 
law for electricity sector liberalization, iv) unbundling (or vertical separation) of the 
main segments, v) incentive regulation of electricity networks, vii) establishment of a 
wholesale electricity market, viii) introduction of privatization and ix) introduction of 
private independent power producers (IPPs). The Chilean reform model was soon 
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followed by the UK (1990) and Norway (1991). The success of the model in these 
countries under stable political and economic conditions demonstrated the potential of 
introducing market-based reforms and incentive regulation to other countries around the 
world signalling the advent of modern electricity reforms. Figure 1 shows the market-
oriented electricity reform steps in Argentina inspired by the popular reform model of 
Chile3. The notable difference between the sequencing of reforms in Argentina and 
Chile is the introduction of IPPs before privatization in the Argentine electricity market. 
 
Figure 1: Electricity reform steps in Argentina 
Source: Adapted from Jamasb (2006) 
 
The remarkable pace and extent of the reforms imply that, by the end of 1990s, many 
advanced economies and around 70 developing and transition countries had adopted 
some market driven reform steps in their electricity sector (Steiner, 2001). The general 
tendency of reform in these countries involved the progression of the reform model 
from a vertically integrated state-owned monopoly towards an unbundled competitive 
market. Figure 2 shows that market-based electricity reforms involved progressively 
introducing and deepening competition at the generation, wholesale and retail level 
respectively. The single buyer model with IPP participation remain the dominant 
electricity model across many Asian and African countries while the majority of LACs 
have pursued creating a competitive wholesale and retail market based on the standard 
reform model.  
 
                                                          
3 PCAP stands for price-cap; rTPA stands for regulated third party access; SRMC stands for 
short-run marginal cost while D, G and T stands for distribution, generation and transmission 
respectively.  
 Figure 2: Electricity market models transitioning 
 
Source: Adapted from USAID (2004) 
 
3. Drivers of Reforms 
 
The demonstration effect from early success stories was only one of the major drivers of 
electricity reforms around the world. The electricity sectors in the developed countries 
were characterised by excess capacity coupled with the use of expensive generation 
technologies and being productively inefficient and cross subsidies from residential 
customers to industrial users (Jamasb et al, 2005a). In developing countries, reforms 
were driven by energy deficit, the operational and economic inefficiency of the state-led 
vertically integrated utilities, the inability of the state sector to raise adequate capital, 
the lack of electricity access across the population, the need to reform state subsidies for 
better allocation of resources and the desire to raise revenue for the state through the 
sale of state assets (Bacon and Besant-Jones, 2001). 
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The appeal of utility privatisation was particularly strong among the transition countries 
and the Latin American countries (LACs). These economies experienced massive 
market-oriented systemic changes in all sectors of their economy since the early 1990s. 
The structural change included macro stabilization, price liberalization, eliminating 
institutions of the communist systems and openness to international trade. These 
reforms were also termed as Type I reforms while Type II reforms included the design 
and enforcement of laws, regulation and proper institutions to support and nurture the 
functioning of the market driven reforms (Svejnar, 2002). Large-scale economic 
privatisation combined with the establishment of legal institutions in establishing well-
defined property rights and contracts and anti-corruption agencies were the major 
hallmarks of the Type II reforms. Among the LACs, the first electricity privatisation 
took place in Chile in 1982, followed by Argentina in 1992 and some privatisations in 
Brazil. The appeal of privatisation grew following the early experiences in other LACs 
such as Peru, Colombia and Bolivia. Privatisation coupled with wholesale market 
competition and independent regulation remains the major elements of reform among 
the developing countries of Latin America. 
 
The shift from a vertically integrated public monopoly to a competitive power sector by 
undertaking the structural, regulatory and ownership reforms was also strongly 
encouraged by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other 
international financial institutions in developing and transition countries. The World 
Bank changed its lending policy in 1992 for the power sector development from 
traditional project lending to policy lending implying that any borrowing country should 
adopt the market-based standard reform model. This background explains the appeal of 
privatisation and market-oriented reform in developing and transition economies which, 
at times, preceded other necessary reform measures (Jamasb, 2006). 
 
The emergence of transition economies coincided with the world-wide power sector 
reforms. Hence, market-oriented reforms began soon after the collapse of Soviet Union 
and within the context of overall macroeconomic reforms in transition countries. In 
particular, large-scale privatization of the electricity sector was experienced in the 
context of broader economic changes among the transition countries indicating that 
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reforms should also be understood and explained in the wider macroeconomic context 
in these countries (Pollitt, 2009a). While the transition countries associated with the 
European Union made some progress in line with the EU electricity reform model, for 
other transition countries the incentives to implement reforms can be regarded as being 
mixed.  
 
Similarly, in advanced economics particularly the EU, the motives for reform came as 
an initiative from the European Commission through two electricity directives in 1996 
and 2003 (Newbery, 2002). The EU directive 96/92/EC laid down the foundations 
concerning common rules towards the creating of an internal market for electricity. The 
2003 directive (2003/54/EC) established several key objectives to be achieved by 1 
July, 2007 such as the creation of an independent regulator, 100% market opening to all 
customers including households, legal unbundling of the network segments from 
generation and supply and free entry in generation via a non-discriminatory network 
access to third-parties. In addition, the EU Directive 2009/72/EC underscored the need 
to mitigate the barriers to cross-border trade and expand interconnections towards 
creating an integrated single market for electricity in Europe.  
 
However, the integration of small-island economies such as Ireland in the wider EU 
market currently remains an interesting political and economic challenge for Europe in 
the creation towards an integrated and common electricity market in Europe. The 
challenge of establishing an integrated market for electricity in Europe grows bigger 
when market integration goals have to be pursued along with the climate change and 
security of supply targets remains a political and economic challenge  
 
However, the European reform model excludes some aspects of the standard model that 
are present in some of the leading reform countries. The directives have avoided 
requiring strict ownership change which is regarded as a sovereign matter and thus 
politically sensitive. It is not mandatory to privatise the state-owned assets as 
experienced under successful electricity liberalisation in Norway, Sweden and France 
although there is a major emphasis to increase private sector participation based on the 
standard or generic reform model. The ownership unbundling of transmission system 
8 
 
operation or transmission assets is not explicitly required in the EU directives though in 
many of the pioneer countries independent system operation now exist (Jamasb and 
Pollitt, 2005).  
 
Table 1 summarises the major drivers of electricity reforms across developing and 
transition countries in terms of 'pull' and 'push' factors. While the ‘push’ factors mostly 
include the unfavourable macroeconomic conditions; the ‘pull’ factors captures the 
incentives associated with adopting electricity reforms. 
 
Push Factors Pull Factors 
Macroeconomic events:  
The 1970s oil crisis, Post-Soviet 
economy-wide market-based transition 
(1989), Asian Financial crisis (1997-
1998), economy-wide liberalization and 
reform programs as initiated by the 
fiscal crisis. 
Capital raising options:  
Privatization of state assets, greenfield 
private investment. 
Limited national fiscal ability:  
High public debt, utility borrowing as a 
major proportion of national debt. 
Lending for institutional reform: 
Macroeconomic stabilization lending 
conditional upon power sector 
restructuring, asset privatization (IMF), 
liberalisation and reform for new power 
sector loans (World Bank in 1993). 
OECD Deregulation:  
New energy multinationals created as a 
result of OECD energy sector 
deregulation, provided investment 
opportunities for Europe and USA. 
Spill-over effects from international 
experiences:  
Learning from pioneering reforms of 
power sectors in Chile, England and Wales 
and Norway in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Investments constraints of the power 
sector:  
No ability to self-finance, system 
upgrading and modernization required 
high projected electricity demand. 
EU accession:  
Ppportunities to benefit from regional 
integration by reforming the power sector 
in accordance with the EU Directives. 
Table 1: Drivers of power sector reforms 
Source: Adapted from Nepal and Jamasb (2012a) 
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4. Reforms Context 
 
The initial context of reforms varied across the reforming countries that went under the 
wave of market-based electricity reforms. Resource characteristics and sector 
endowments, initial sector structure and institutional strength evolving the electricity 
sector differed across the reforming countries at the start of the reform process.  
 
i) Size of the sector: The size of the electricity sector is a crucial but often ignored 
concept in electricity sector reforms. The size of the system can influence the reform 
capabilities and reform options of individual reforming countries. Hence, not all reform 
elements prescribed by the standard textbook model can be suitably applied across all 
countries. For example, it is not clear if the smaller systems such as the Nepalese 
electricity sector also require or benefit from vertical separation and third-party access 
in a developing country context. Likewise, the integration of wholesale markets and 
deepening of competition through expanding interconnections is not clear in small 
markets and developed island states such as Ireland. This is because the scope for 
competition may be limited implying that the benefits of adopting a full reform package 
may be small in relation to the costs in small electricity systems. It is not appropriate to 
unbundle a power system with less than 1000 megawatts (MW) of capacity into many 
separate generation and distribution companies with the assumption that effective 
competition will develop (Besant-Jones, 2006).  
 
However, the importance of sector size on the determinants and performance of reforms 
has not received adequate attention in the reform literature implying a considerable 
knowledge gap. Bacon (1999) provided important information on the extent of reforms 
possible in small electricity systems which clearly motivates studying the impacts of 
different stages of reform on performance among the reforming countries with varying 
sector endowments. 
 
ii) Sector structure: The initial sector structure at the time of reforms is a function of 
the sector’s history, resource endowment and past policies. The initial structure defines 
the starting point of the reform process and is a given factor (Jamasb et al., 2005b). For 
example, the transition countries inherited the features of the command economy on to 
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the power sector which led to politically determined power prices, excess capacity and 
high levels of electrification at the start of economic liberalisation.  
 
However, the reform measures adopted has a direct impact on the performance of the 
sector. Reforms take time to implement and produce the desired effects. Hence, it is 
important that the appropriate structure is envisaged from the start of the reform 
(Jamasb et al., 2005b). For example, the transition countries adopted the market-
oriented electricity reforms but did not effectively create suitable institutions to support 
the market driven reforms. Whether the reform in the electricity sector worked or not is 
a matter of empirical investigation and is clearly missing in the past literature studying 
electricity sector reforms. 
 
iii) Institutional factors: These factors refer to sector and economy level legal and 
regulatory framework that influence and support the continuity of the reform process in 
the electricity sector. According to North (1991), institutions are humanly devised 
constraints that structure human interaction at the political, economic and social levels, 
provide incentive structure of an economy, create order and reduce uncertainty in 
exchange. From an institutional economics perspective, institutions constitute two 
essential components: the institutional environment and institutional arrangement 
(Williamson, 1995). The institutional environment is concerned with macro-level 'rules 
of the game' which can be formal or informal while institutional arrangement focusses 
on micro-level governance mechanism. The institutional endowment of a country 
largely influences the institutional environment and includes five elements: legislative 
and executive system, judicial system, administrative system, informal rules and social 
and ideological character of the nation (Levy and Spiller, 1994). 
 
The reforms and regulation of the electricity sector in developing countries tend to 
suffer from low levels of institutional environment in terms of limited regulatory 
capacity, limited accountability, limited commitment and limited fiscal efficiency 
(Laffont, 2005). The weak institutional environment implies that reforms and regulation 
of the electricity sector can be ineffective. Regulation becomes prone to political 
capture becoming a tool of self-interest within the government or ruling elite (Stiglitz, 
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1998). In contrary, developed countries have robust institutional framework and 
arrangements in place as they have high institutional endowment. This implies that 
implementing reforms and regulation of the sector is easy and feasible in developed 
economies. Whether reforms and regulation of the electricity sector in developed 
economies is effective or not requires exact empirical testing. This is because many 
developed countries have exhausted the reform steps under the standard model implying 
that current reforms are driven by the need to meet different national and regional 
objectives. For example, an isolated small island developed economy like Ireland with 
robust institutions in place faces major challenges to increase market integration with 
other wholesale electricity markets in Europe by expanding interconnections.  
 
5. Analysis of the reform experience 
 
Economic principles suggest that a reform should be undertaken if it will engender a net 
positive economic welfare impact. This implies that a social-cost benefit analysis 
(SCBA) prior to reform is can help to assess the effectiveness of reforms. A SCBA 
considers reforms and restructuring as an investment and compares the costs of 
investment with the benefit which is the change in actual and projected performance 
relative to a defined counterfactual of what would have happened in the absence of 
reform and restructuring (Jones et al., 1990). However, assessing the effectiveness of 
electricity reforms experience can be complex as it includes different interrelated steps, 
can occur in different forms or models and is a dynamic process (Pollitt, 2009). 
Electricity reforms are multi-dimensional activities with many interacting factors and a 
variety of impacts that a SCBA may inadequately capture. Hence, there exist other 
important applicable approaches to analyse electricity reform which can be classified 
into four major categories: econometric studies, efficiency and productivity analysis, 
macro studies and individual and comparative case studies. 
 
Econometric studies can analyse well-defined issues and hypothesis tests through 
statistical analysis of reform drivers and performance. Performance metric regressions 
based on cross-section and panel data econometrics are applied for this purpose. 
Efficiency and productivity analyses are desirable for assessing the effectiveness with 
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which each agent's inputs are transformed into outputs in relation to best practice using 
frontier methodologies. Such studies reduce the need for rigorous data and especially 
when the data is challenging to collect.  
 
Macro studies of reforms estimate their impacts using general equilibrium models of the 
economy. The advantage of the reform studies based on general equilibrium modelling 
is that these studies attempt to model the interaction effects of sector reform with non-
reforming sectors and calculate the aggregate welfare effect directly. Likewise, single or 
multi-country case studies are desirable when in-depth investigation or qualitative 
analysis is needed. Case studies can examine the issues that do not easily lend 
themselves to rigorous quantitative analysis or could not be analysed due to lack of 
comprehensive data.  
 
We use case-studies to analyse the progress and outcomes of market-driven electricity 
reforms across the less-developed, transition and advanced economies since the early 
1990s. This is because electricity sector restructuring and privatisation is a complex 
process that involves mainly institutional and organisational issues, degree of 
intervention and the degree of competition such as unbundling versus vertically 
integrated structures (Anaya, 2010). The electricity sectors of Nepal, Belarus and 
Ireland are chosen for this purpose. Power sector reforms in these countries varied in 
terms of motives, context and system size. Nepal is a developing country in South Asia 
and has a small electricity system and suffering from increasing electricity demand with 
growing political instability. The Nepalese electricity sector also initiated reforms in the 
electricity sector since the early 1990s, often due to direct lending pressures from 
international financial institutions. Belarus is a transition country that experienced 
electricity reforms in the context of overall macroeconomic reforms in the economy. 
Furthermore, the transition countries are of special interest in the context of analysing 
the electricity reform process because they include a diverse mix of countries belonging 
to different stages of economic development and at different stages of the reform 
process. Ireland is an island economy aiming to deepen competition in the wholesale 
market through increased interconnections. The wholesale market in Ireland can be 
considered a small system as compared to other wholesale electricity markets in Europe. 
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Ireland initiated the reform process as a consequence of successful reform experience in 
the UK with the need to comply with the EU directives. 
 
5.1 Nepal 
 
Nepal (officially the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal) is a less-developed 
landlocked economy in South Asia sandwiched by two of the world's fastest growing 
and energy hungry economies India and China with a geographical area of 147,181 
square kilometres. The country has a population of about 27 million while the per capita 
income is about 1,200 US dollars in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms implying a 
low-income nation. The country has a low Human Development Index of 0.46 while the 
Transparency International perceives Nepal as one of the most corrupt countries in the 
world ranking 154 out of 182 countries in 2011.  
 
Electricity sector reform process started in Nepal since 1985 with the establishment of 
Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) (Thakur, 2002). NEA is a vertically-integrated 
(although functional unbundling exists) monolithic state-owned and controlled entity 
responsible for the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity across the 
economy. The establishment of NEA eventually paved the way towards creating a legal 
framework and corporatization of the sector through the formulation of the hydropower 
development policy of 1992 and was enforced by the Water Resources Act and the 
Electricity Act with amendments made to the NEA Act of 1984 (ADB,1999). 
 
The Act led to the opening of the generation segment to the private domestic and 
foreign IPP's through non-recourse financing while also theoretically allowing NEA to 
function autonomously. The entry of the private sector in power generation imply that 
NEAs status was replaced from that of a sole monopoly player to that of a licensee with 
the responsibility of buying the privately generated power in accordance to a single-
buyer model (SBM). In addition, the Community Electricity Distribution Bye Laws was 
introduced in 2003 with the objectives of promoting public participation in reducing 
non-technical power losses (such as theft) and institutionalising distribution, encourage 
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community management in the extension of distribution lines and promote rural 
electrification.  
 
However, the outcomes seem to have contradicted the objectives after more than two 
decades of reforms. The vertically-integrated system has developed only around 0.72 
GW out of potential 40 GW of generation capacity including the IPPs' generation 
indicating lack of investments in generation while the peak demand is also projected to 
increase to 2206 MW by 2020 and 3679 MW by 2030 (NEA, 2010). The electricity 
prices remain too low to cover costs and support system expansion and suffer from 
persistent cross-subsidization among domestic and industrial customers. The price-cost 
gap has exacerbated the financial health of NEA with an overwhelming loss of NRs. 
4681 million in 2009 (NEA, 2009).  
 
Likewise, the technical and non-technical electricity losses remain high in Nepal like in 
other South-Asian countries (Smith, 2004). The electricity losses amounted to 25% of 
the total generation in 2011 due to power theft and technical issues such as old grid 
infrastructures and lack of proper metering in the face of increasing national demand for 
electricity (NEA, 2012). In terms of electricity access, NEA currently serves 15% of the 
total population with electricity indicating low level of electrification under conditions 
of large disparity among urban and rural customers. Electrification rate in urban area is 
90% where only 9% of the total population reside while the electrification rate in rural 
area is 5%. Thus, the Nepalese electricity sector resembles a monopolistic public utility 
suffering from chronic underinvestment and insufficient capitalization, politically-
regulated low and distorted tariffs coupled with low access rate, frequent supply 
interruptions, and widespread financial and operation inefficiency. 
 
The on-going decade long political instability led to discontinued policies, uncertainty, 
and often weak and stalled implementation of reforms in the electricity sector and 
thereby explaining the poor state of the sector. Persistent political instability has also 
placed constraints on timeframe for undertaking reforms as any reform that extends 
beyond the lifespan of the government becomes politically infeasible and thereby 
slowing down or stalling the reform progress as a whole (Bhattacharya, 2007). Hence, 
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political stability is essential because reforms imply changes in institutional 
arrangements while these changes can only sustain in the stability of the rule-makers. 
The government is the influential rule-maker in the Nepalese context.  However, 
political instability is likely to continue in Nepal implying that the electricity sector will 
have to develop under unfavourable institutional environment and arrangements to 
achieve the long-term national economic objectives. 
 
As such, tariffs reforms, increased private sector participation and improvement in 
governance mechanisms through the establishment of an effective independent 
regulatory body seem more urgent than unbundling of NEA in the present context 
(Nepal and Jamasb, 2012b). This is because the existence of effective regulatory body 
can facilitate private participation in the sector and act as a mechanism to protect the 
sector from political instability and also expand generation to meet demand by investing 
foreign and domestic private capital under conditions by setting fair terms for entry and 
access. However, it is necessary for less-developed economies like Nepal to have a 
cautious restructuring at first as effective regulation is a complex and difficult task 
facing any energy regulators eve in developed economies. As the sector grows larger in 
the long run, complete vertical separation of the networks and privatisation of them is 
an option while accounting separation of the competitive and monopoly segments is 
desirable in the short term to promote transparency, accountability and prevent 
corruption in the sector.  
 
5.2. Belarus 
 
Belarus (officially the Federal Republic of Belarus) is a landlocked transition economy 
in Eastern Europe bordered by Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia with a 
total area of 207,595 square kilometres. The country has on overall population of about 
9.7 million while the per capita income is about 15,000 US dollars in PPP terms 
implying an upper-middle-income economy. The nation has a high HDI score of 0.76 
while the Transparency International perceives Belarus as a corrupt country with a rank 
of 143 out of 182 countries in 2011. 
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Electricity reform process has been slow in Belarus since it declared independence on 
25 August, 1991 and only includes some initial aspects of market-based reforms. The 
electricity sector is dominated by the state-owned and controlled holding company 
Belenergo created in 2006 comprising six regional power system enterprises responsible 
for the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity in Belraus. Belenergo 
serves as the single buyer of power including imported electricity while there are no 
independent power plants and producers. The reliance on imported energy (crude oil 
and natural gas from Russia) coupled with upward surging electricity demand imply 
that energy efficiency remains the core aspect of electricity reform in Belarus (Rakova 
and Pavel, 2005).  
 
The 'Law on Energy Saving', enacted in 1998 and amended in 2006 sets out the need to 
promote energy efficiency as a matter of national priority while setting various targets 
in reducing energy intensity from 2005 levels. Likewise, the 'Law on Renewable Energy 
Sources' was adopted in 2010 that sets out the directions of state regulations concerning 
the use of non-traditional and renewable energy sources as the country aims to be 
energy independent and address its unbalanced fuel portfolio situations (REEEP, 2012). 
However, there is no clear and explicit 'electricity laws' in Belarus.  
 
In addition, Belarus is planning to create a wholesale electricity market to be operative 
by 2015 motivated by the reform experience around the world. The details of creating a 
wholesale market is being laid down in new electricity bill as declared on 23 May, 2012 
(BELTA, 2012). The creation of a wholesale market is expected to attract foreign direct 
investments, make spending transparent and reduce generation costs.  
 
However, the Belarusian electricity market faces several principal concerns at present 
since various early attempts of reforms. Capacity shortage and security of supply 
concerns continue to evolve the electricity market as the electricity system mostly rely 
on imported gas as fuel covering 90% of the domestic demand while the remaining 10% 
being imported from Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania. The load forecast for 2020 is 
expected to reach 13,000 MW given the existing installed capacity of 8,247 MW when 
around 60% of the power plants have reached their worn out points of tightening 
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capacity (Zachmann et al., 2008). The electricity prices are politically regulated and 
well below the long run marginal cost of electricity supply (LRMC) and too low when 
compared to other transition countries (EBRD, 2004). This is particularly interesting for 
Belarus when electrification is generally not considered an issue among the transition 
countries with increasing emphasis towards economic and operational efficiency of the 
sector (Stern, 2009)4.  
 
Electricity losses in the transmission and distribution networks reached 11.3% of power 
production in Belarus which was almost twice the OECD average of 6.8% (IEA, 2008). 
The electricity market lacks overall transparency due to vertical and horizontal 
integration of the industry coupled with the absence of any clear separation of 
government policy from commercial management and economic regulation of the 
electricity supply industry in Belarus.  
 
The slow and politically reluctant reform process in Belarus indicates that the transition 
to market-based economic reforms was not a political choice but rather a consequence 
of past economic and political system to some extent. Nonetheless, Belarus needs to 
restructure and possibly privatize the sector in the path towards creation of a wholesale 
market and increase transparency. Further, privatization should be pursued only after 
creating an effective institution to govern the privatisation process in the form of 
independent regulators. An independent regulation shall ensure the opening of the 
Belenergo network to third parties on a clear non-discriminatory basis along with 
utilizing incentives for cost reduction without affecting service quality. The gradual 
increase in residential prices up to the LRMC level with no direct subsidies and cross-
subsidies is essential to make the market sustainable.  
 
Transition economies like Belarus experiencing overall-market based reforms in the 
economy need to harmonise the inter-sector reforms in the economy to make the 
reforms work (Nepal and Jamasb, 2012a). For example, adjacent reforms should be 
carried out to solve the structural problems in biggest electricity consuming sectors such 
                                                          
4 This is also reflected in the famous quote by Lenin in 1920 that 'Communism is Soviet power 
plus electrification of the whole country'. 
as housing, utilities and industries to make the electricity reforms successful while 
deregulation of electricity prices should be supported by deregulation of gas prices 
under a competition policy framework.  
 
5.3. Ireland 
 
Ireland (officially known as the Republic of Ireland) is an island economy in Europe 
sharing its only border with Northern Ireland and encompasses an area of 70,273 square 
kilometres. The country has a population of about 4.5 million while the per capita 
income is about 39,000 US Dollars in PPP terms implying a high-income economy. The 
nation has a very high HDI score of 0.96 while the Transparency International perceives 
Ireland as a relatively corruption free country with a rank of 19 out of 182 countries in 
2011. 
 
Electricity reform process in Ireland is based on the EU Directives driven to integrate 
separate and national electricity markets into one since 2000. Ireland responded to the 
EU Directives by opening the market fully in 2005 from a 30% market opening in 2000 
(Valeri Malaguzzi, 2009). Ireland achieved the institutional notion of market integration 
with the creation of an all-island Single Electricity Market (SEM). The Single 
Electricity Market Operator (SEMO) facilitates the operation of SEM and is a joint 
venture of the system operators between the Republic of Ireland (EIRGrid) and 
Northern Ireland (SONI). SEMO is regulated by the Northern Irish Authority for Utility 
Regulation (UREGNI) and Commission for Energy Regulation (CER) consisting of 2.5 
million customers. SEM is a gross mandatory pool for any generator with an export 
capacity of 10 MW. The generators bid in their short-run marginal cost and receive the 
energy-only system marginal price.  
 
The possibility to trade with dual currency (both Sterling Pounds and Euro) makes SEM 
a unique wholesale electricity market in the world. SEM is currently connected to Great 
Britain via the Moyle interconnector amounting to almost 4.7% (about 500 MW) of 
total SEM generation capacity. The all-island market is set to expand interconnections 
and improve market integration with GB with the operation of the East-West 
19 
 
interconnector (500 MW) connecting Ireland with Wales (De Nooij, 2011). Further, the 
regulatory authorities of France, UK and Ireland (FUI) have proposed to couple the day 
ahead wholesale electricity markets in these countries by 2014 in line with the EU 
policy of increasing electricity market integration (EIRGRID, 2012). As such, FUI is a 
regional electricity initiative among France, UK and Ireland. Ireland has also adopted an 
ambitious renewable energy target of as the island plans to generate 40% of its 
electricity from renewable energy sources by 2020 despite a severe economic downturn 
in the country (IEA, 2012). Electricity generation from wind will play an important role 
in the achievement of renewable targets with an already installed capacity of 2000 MW 
capable of powering about 1.3 million households in Ireland.  
 
However, the Irish market faces several challenges despite adopting advanced 
electricity reform measures. It mostly relies on imported gas (around 90%) and oil from 
UK for electricity generation. Oil constitutes around 60% of national energy 
consumption. This indicates that Ireland faces one of the highest wholesale electricity 
prices in Europe besides Denmark and Germany in addition to resulting security of 
supply concerns (European Commission, 2011). This implies that the economic notion 
of regional market integration remains a far-fetched reality in Ireland. Wholesale market 
concentration is also high as the installed capacity share of the three largest generators 
in the Republic of Ireland amounted to 88% of the installed capacity at the end of 2009 
indicating market power concerns and lack of competition in Ireland (European 
Commission, 2011).  
 
The relatively small size of the market, lack of confidence in the regulatory regime and 
the dominance of the Irish market by the vertically-integrated and state-owned 
Electricity Supply Board (ESB) imply that Irish market has failed to attract new entrants 
after the start of liberalisation process started in 1999 (McCarthy, 2005). In addition, the 
current level of market integration between SEM and GB markets is only 0.17 (out of 1 
where a value of 1 indicates full market integration) despite being physically 
interconnected indicating the inefficient use of the existing Moyle interconnector (Nepal 
and Jamasb, 2012c). Hence, the FUI market coupling can be a desirable solution for 
Ireland to promote efficiency in interconnector usage while other market coupling 
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possibilities should also be explored. Moreover, the transition towards a low-carbon 
economy can increase the reliance on imported gas as gas-fired power plants will be 
required to provide flexibility in electricity supply when wind power is not available. 
 
Thus, the Irish electricity market is poised towards improving regional market 
integration in the face of growing amount of wind power in the energy mix. However, 
improving market integration requires greater investment in interconnectors under 
correct regulatory and market incentives for traders to effectively engage in trading via 
the interconnectors. The increasing role of wind power in the wholesale market may 
necessitate redesigning the existing market to support such transition. Expanding 
interconnections will enable SEM to effectively utilise the growing wind generation by 
exporting to the UK and other markets as there are physical limitations to the amount of 
wind that can be accommodated within the SEM. As such, it is desirable that Ireland 
also adopts the carbon price floor as Northern Ireland which shall also mitigate the 
discrepancies between these two jurisdictions (Newbery, 2012).  
 
Further, increasing market integration between SEM and other markets in Europe will 
depend upon the harmonisation of several market design and institutional features such 
as gate closure timings, composition of wholesale prices, form of generation bids and 
market scheduling and dispatch. Harmonising these market and institutional features 
across other EU markets will be a major political and economic challenge for an all-
island small and isolated wholesale market like SEM to improve market integration 
with the EU. However, adequate harmonisation between the two internal system 
operators (EirGrid and SONI) can be a pre-requisite to improve integration of the all-
island electricity market with rest of the EU.  
 
 
6. Discussions 
 
The above case studies suggest that significant heterogeneity exists in the power sector 
process and outcomes across the developed, transition and developing economies. 
However, it is not clear from the analysis that the application of the market-driven 
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reform process has been a global success after nearly three decades of reforms and 
restructuring of the electricity sector. This necessitates a better understanding of the 
lessons and policy implications of electricity reforms based on liberal market-oriented 
policies. 
 
The academics, policymakers and practitioners in favour of the standard reform model 
may generalise the success of reforms in pioneer countries such as NordPool, UK, Chile 
and other LACs like Argentina, Colombia, Brazil and Peru in concluding that the 
market-based reforms can be successful when implemented properly. These LACs 
preferred to pursue competition and privatisation of the electricity sector as opposed to 
the single buyer model with public ownership in most South Asian countries like Nepal. 
In contrast, those critical of  the reform process can generalize the outcomes of the slow 
and unstable market-based reforms in Eastern Europe, Asia5 and Africa in concluding 
that the reform process has been costly, unsuccessful and economically wasteful. In 
addition, the severe market failures in the Californian electricity market during 2001-
2002 cannot be ignored. Even Chile and Argentina have experienced power sector 
problems in the last decade although being the most illustrative examples of successful 
market-based reform in Latin America (Anaya, 2010). Hence, it is necessary to draw out 
relevant lessons and policy recommendations based on the reform discourse observed 
from experiences of different countries at different stages of economic development and 
at varying stages of the market-oriented reform process.  
 
It is necessary in developing and transition countries to impose cost-reflective prices in 
order to make their electricity systems sustainable. However, this should be carried out 
in the presence of a cautious re-balancing mechanism between economic efficiency and 
social equity to offset the undesirable social effects of a hike in tariffs. For example, 
price adjustments can be done before privatisation rather than after privatisation for 
socio-economic reasons if privatisation of the electricity companies is considered as an 
option for reform in less-developed countries. However, as in the case of Norwegian 
reform, local and regional ownership of the electricity sector may work instead of 
                                                          
5 The Indian state of Orissa provides a clear example where the application of the market driven 
electricity reforms truly failed (Sen and Jamasb, 2013).  
complete privatization in these countries lacking any comprehensive privatization 
experience.  
 
The privatisation experience in some LACs also garnered public opposition due to the 
failure of liberalised reform process to deliver for the poor while being linked to bad 
governance and corruption (Roland, 2008). It also provides a lesson to have a proper 
regulatory agency in place when moving ahead with any contractual arrangements via 
PPAs between the IPPs and the incumbent (Gausch et al., 2006). Similarly, governance 
improvements are crucial to control corruption and the issues of non-payment. 
Improvements in governance are necessary to have the independent regulation in place 
in the case of reforms being adopted. Thus, corruption control together with skilled 
work force enrichment and carefully determined sustainable electricity prices may be 
more essential in developing and transition countries rather than the costly reforms as 
per the standard model. Therefore, the application and sequencing of electricity sector 
reforms in less-developed and developing countries will be largely country-specific 
depending upon individual country needs and priorities and should not be based on the 
'keeping up with the joneses' principles (Nepal and Jamasb, 2012b). 
 
The early success stories also demonstrate that market-based reforms require the 
presence of appropriate institutions and effective governance mechanisms. Chile and 
Norway had well designed economic institutions in place to buttress market-based 
reforms in the sector. Hence, it is essential that appropriate governance mechanisms be 
put in place so that the social and institutional capacities of the country are able to 
support the reforms being implemented in the power sector of developing and transition 
countries. In addition, political objectives should not be prioritised at the cost of sound 
economic principles while the political-economy arrangements in these countries should 
facilitate the reform process in the electricity sector. A better understanding of the 
political economy evolving the energy sector needs to be developed to better inform the 
reform design process in developing and transition countries. 
 
Social legitimacy and public acceptance of reforms are crucial factors in tackling the 
traditional problems of power theft and non-payment in most of the transition and 
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developing countries. Social legitimacy and public acceptance of reforms can increase if 
the adopted reform programs adequately reflect the local or country-specific economic, 
political and social conditions evolving the power sector rather than completely holding 
to a reform ideology that proved successful elsewhere.  
 
The reforms have worked relatively better in economies like NordPool and the LACs 
despite some differences among their models, because they pursued home-grown 
reforms reflecting local conditions rather than being complete followers. Thus, it is not 
clear if the market-centred EU electricity reform model which is in a trail phase across 
the EU-25 is a suitable reform model for transition countries. As such, the development 
policymakers should not rely on formulaic economic or systems models for power 
sector reform.  
 
In advanced economies such as the EU, increased investments in transmission networks 
and transmission infrastructures connecting the cross-border markets coupled with the 
efficient allocation and usage of transmission capacity are essential to improve the 
market integration process. This is particularly true for small regions and island states in 
the EU (Nepal and Jamasb, 2012c). The transition towards a less carbon intensive 
energy-economy, increasing digitization of the grid (so called smart grids), larger 
adoption of renewable energy and the growing integration of electric vehicles imply 
undertaking capital-intensive tasks of maintaining and re-designing the existing grid to 
accommodate these technological transitions in the networks.  
 
However, the lack of adequate investments in both transmission and distribution 
networks is a major market failure of the modern day liberalised market structures in the 
EU built on the standard reform model. It is estimated that the transition towards a 
sustainable and smart energy economy will require an investment of about 200 billion 
euros in electricity and gas transmission networks (Vinois, 2012). Thus, the on-going 
quest towards the creation of a single electricity market will significantly depend on the 
ability of the EU electricity markets to innovate the required level of investments in the 
networks and cross-border infrastructures.  
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Increased investments and a significant rise in grid related capital costs will necessitate 
a rise in the consumer electricity bills. Rising end-user electricity bills can be a major 
concern even for countries like the UK where around 4.75 million households 
experiencing fuel poverty in 2010 (DECC, 2012). Hence, developed economies also 
face a major challenge to balance between economic efficiency and social equity as in 
less developed and developing countries. As electricity bills rise, more emphasis should 
be placed towards energy efficiency and innovation, the use of energy efficient 
technologies and demand-side management in advanced economies like the EU. The 
effective role of regulation to generate the required level of investments and mitigate the 
adverse impacts of electricity price rises would be equally important. 
 
The lack of adequate network investments is a critical issue for less-developed and 
developing countries even though the current principal concerns with reforms is mostly 
associated on the generation adequacy and easing capacity shortage. It is inevitable that 
the existing grid in these countries cannot accommodate all electricity generated as 
generation continue to expand to meet the growing demand. Further, the gradual switch 
towards renewable energy sources will exert additional pressure on the existing grid in 
terms of integrating generation into the transmission and distribution networks unless 
re-designed and updated.  For example, the simultaneous failure of three of India’s five 
regional transmission grids left roughly 600 million people across twenty states without 
access to electricity over a period of approximately two days in July, 2012 (Sen and 
Jamasb, 2013). The blackout experience teaches a valuable lesson for developing 
countries to also invest in power infrastructures and effectively manage demand in 
meeting the growing electricity demand spurred by economic growth. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This paper has assessed the process and outcomes of market-driven reforms evolving 
the electricity sector of the less-developed, transition and developed countries based on 
country-specific case studies. The electricity sectors of Nepal, Belarus and Ireland were 
analysed. The reform process in these countries vary in terms of motives, context and 
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sector size. The case studies indicate that reforming the sector is a major economic, 
political and social challenge across all countries. Therefore, qualitative and quantitative 
evaluation of the reform process is difficult irrespective of the evaluation of reforms 
being a matter of empirical testing or a theoretical debate. 
 
This study cast doubts on the net benefit of competition arising from implementing 
market driven reforms in small electricity systems. Hence, evidence is needed to assert 
the appropriateness of full adoption of the market driven reforms in small systems. 
Further research is required to estimate the relevant costs and benefits of electricity 
reforms in small systems using cost-benefit analysis. The use of SCBA in analysing the 
effectiveness of electricity reforms in developing countries is limited in the literature 
implying a considerable knowledge gap. Hence, undertaking a SCBA of reforms can 
offer useful policy guidance for developing and transition countries before 
implementing a comprehensive electricity reform. 
The analysis also portrays mixed evidence of market-based reforms in improving access 
to electricity in developing and transition countries. Market driven reforms have 
significantly improved access in most of the LACs while the model has been less 
successful in South Asia in improving electricity access. In contrary, centrally planned 
models have been successful in delivering higher levels of electrification in transition 
countries. Universal electrification has also been successfully achieved in China despite 
a population over 1.3 billion. Hence, further research is required to assess the suitable 
model for improving electricity access in developing countries.  
It is evident from the case-studies that the reform process remains a work in progress 
and a never-ending process across all countries. Majority of the less-developed and 
developing countries are still at some stages of the standard reform model. Developed 
countries have established a well-functioning wholesale spot market but are suffering 
from market power concerns coupled with the inability to sustain competition and lack 
of investments in the networks. Climate change and security of supply issues in the face 
of regulatory uncertainty have raised new concerns in advanced economies such as the 
EU who have already reached the advanced stage of the market-based reform process. 
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For example, recent reforms in the UK are being driven by capacity shortage concerns 
as is also present among the less-developed and developing countries.  
However, the contexts vary. While cost-reflective pricing and privatisation in the 
presence of sound regulation can mitigate the capacity concerns in developing 
countries; developed countries such as UK need new market model and industry 
structure to increase the production and accommodation of renewable energy sources. 
This shall discourage fossil-based generation in the transition towards a low-carbon 
economy and meet the EU energy policy goals and environmental targets.  
The reliance on market driven model and the extent to which it has been pursued also 
reflects a political belief in the efficacy of the markets. However, competitive markets 
with independent regulatory body have exhibited significant market and regulatory 
failures as observed among the EU electricity markets. In contrary, active involvement 
of the state in the sector across developing countries has often demonstrated severe 
political failures in electricity sector management and operation as evident among some 
transition and most South Asian countries. The electricity market model in EU has also 
demonstrated considerable stress in recent times in delivering the large scale investment 
needs in expanding electricity infrastructure in meeting the climate change targets and 
security of supply. This indicates the need to carefully assess whether the electricity 
market reforms and solutions should be replaced by greater state intervention. 
Successful electricity reforms require coordinated progress on all aspects of the 
development process, namely political, macro-economic, sectoral, and financial to be 
successful. The interplay and intricacies between the economic, social and political 
factors complicates the reform process. Further, new economic, political and 
technological challenges will evolve the sector as market based reforms continue to 
progress (or halt) across all countries, though at varying speed. As such, it is clear that 
electricity reforms are an evolving and changing process rather than a one-off event. 
These factors lead to a unanimous conclusion that electricity sector reform will remain a 
complex process in all economies. 
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